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A Comparative Research on the Two Types of PPP Contracts:   
Availability Payment PPP vs. Concession PPP  
 
ABSTRACT 
It is fair to say that the research on Public Private Partnership (PPP), in particular, on its risk-return 
profiles, is rare, despite the fact that this form of infrastructure financing has been on the rise during the 
last two decades in a diverse set of countries. This study aims to fill that gap by offering a comparative 
study on the two frequently-employed PPP contracts in Korea and other countries - Availability 
Payment (AP) PPP contracts vs. Concession (C) PPP contracts - with respect to ex post (or realized 
during the operational stage) risk-adjusted return characteristics. To that end, we compiled an unique 
project-level data set that covers the performance indicators of those PPP projects initiated during 1995 
to 2014 in Korea both at-contract as well as at-operation stages, and applied a three-factor CAPM model 
to estimate the alpha and beta for those two types of PPP contracts. Our empirical results indicate that: 
ceteris paribus, AP-PPP entails a higher market-driven risk to the private partners; the systematic risk 
factors caused by the size and by the book-to-market-ratio have statistically significant effects on the 
ex post returns; and, the ex post excess returns are shown to be not significant, neither statistically nor 
economically. Based on our findings, we discuss welfare implications of PPP contracts out of their 
systematic risk characteristics documented. 
 
Keywords: PPP (Public Private Partnership), AP-PPP (BTO), C-PPP (BTL), three-factor CAPM 
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1 Introduction  
 
Since the inception of PFI (Private Finance Initiative) in UK in 1992, the Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) has been widely used in various countries (e.g., Australia, France, Spain, Portugal, a number of 
Asian countries) as a new form of financing to build and operate different types of infrastructure. Korea 
is the country that has embraced the instrument early on, with the enabling legislation enacted in 19941 
(henceforth, the Act) and, since then, over 700 infrastructure projects has so far been funded through 
the PPP contracts, covering a wide array of assets, e.g., roads, railways, ports, airports, water facilities, 
schools, military and public housing, museums, and so on. The first type of PPP contract utilized is 
Availability Payment (or AP-) PPP, which was originally introduced by the Act and was also referred 
to as Built-Transfer-Operate (BTO) deal. The private partner under the AP-PPP contract usually forms 
a Special Purpose Company (SPC), which is responsible for building a facility, transferring the 
ownership to the public entity (i.e., local or national government) upon completion, and operating the 
facility for a pre-fixed time period (e.g., 30 years) during which it recovers construction and operation 
costs and, hopefully, an appropriate net return to the investment by charging a user fee. The second 
contract type, which has been prevalent after the second amendment of the Act in 2005, is (or C) PPP, 
alternatively called as Built-Transfer-Lease (BTL) deal. The main difference between the two is the fact 
that, the first relies on the cashflow (or fee) generated by the facility built, the second receives a pre-
determined periodic payment from the public partner to recover both construction and operation costs 
along with a risk premium that is determined ex ante (i.e., at the time of contract).     
It is well-documented by various recent studies that the PPP-based infrastructure projects are more 
efficient than the traditional government-procured projects as they likely lower construction time as 
well as chance of cost overage (Monteriro (2005), Duffield (2008), Morallos and Amekudzi (2008), 
Graham (2011), Reznichenko (2012), Rajan, Gopinath and Behera (2013), Roy, Kalidindi and 
Soundararajan (2014), The World Bank (2014), Deslauriers (2015)). As to the risk-adjusted return 
profiles of the PPP contracts, the literature also examines different aspects of PPP contracts in different 
countries, such as: the cost of equity capital for AP-PPP in Korea by focusing on the financial 
information of SPCs (Shim (2006)); the excess returns to equity investment for healthcare PFI contracts 
in UK (Vecchi et al. (2013); the estimated optimal AP-PPP contracts in Korea at the time of deal (Shin 
(2009)); and, others to be noted - Bird et al., (2012), and Park et al. (2018). Despite these studies, it is 
fair to say that the existing literature is generally mute on actual (or post-contract) risk-return profiles 
of PPP contracts, e.g., whether the private partners earn appropriate levels of risk-adjusted returns, how 
those realized returns respond to different financial market conditions, and what attributes of the 
                                          
1 The initial act as the Promotion of Private Capital into Social Overhead Capital Investment Act of 1994, 
which was amended twice: first, changed to the Private Participation in Infrastructure (or PPI) Act of 1998, 
which allows project proposal by private entity; and, second, introduced C-PPP (or BTL) in addition to BT) and 
removed or limited Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) by the government. Currently, further revision is 
being contemplated to accommodate the ICT and big data related public projects as well as to convert the list of 
allowable projects from a positive system to a negative one.  
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contract can be modified to make them more sustainable, and so on. This study aims to fill that gap by 
offering a comparative study on the two frequently-employed PPP contracts in Korea and other 
countries - Availability Payment (AP) PPP contracts vs. Concession (C) PPP contracts - with respect to 
ex post (or realized during the operational stage) risk-adjusted return characteristics. To that end, we 
compiled an unique project-level data set that covers the performance indicators of those PPP projects 
initiated during 1995 to 2014 in Korea both at-contract as well as at-operation stages, and applied a 
three-factor CAPM model to estimate the alpha and beta for those two types of PPP contracts. 
Our preliminary results estimated based on the three-factor CAPM model employed indicate that: no 
excess return, neither to holding PPP projects as a whole nor to holding BTO projects, is shown; the 
beta for the market risk premium signals a counter-cyclical nature of PPP cash flows, for example, 
through a negative correlation between macroeconomic condition and cost indicator to PPP projects; 
the PPP cash flows are positively correlated with the spread for high Book-to-Market ratio (BTMR) 
stocks, possibly because such companies’ shares are generally represent value stocks that share a similar 
clientele effect for cash-poor asset-rich consumer segments (i.e., retirees); and, PPP cash flows also 
show a positive correlation with the spread for small-size stocks, which may be caused by a higher of 
the BTL projects in our sample. Going forward, a further investigation is warranted to back the above 
findings. We will explore policy implications of our findings, as to how to change existing PPP contract 
regimes to be more welfare-enhancing in terms of ex ante projected contract rates as well as risk-sharing 
arrangements for both public counterparty (the first “P”) as well as private partner (the second “P”). 
The remainder of the manuscript consists of the following six sections: institutional details of the two 
PPP contracts (section 2); literature review (section 3); data and variables compiled (section 4); 
empirical model and findings (section 5); policy implications and concluding remarks (section 6).  
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2 Institutional details: AP-PPP vs. C-PPP 
 
As of EOY 2016, the on-going (or at-contract) PPP projects in Korea amount to 699 cases with the total 
investment of roughly 100 billion USD. Road and railroad construction represent the largest SOC 
segments funded by PPP, taking a 68.8% share, followed by education or environmental facilities (a 
25.8% share). Between the two contract types, BTO or C-PPP contracts include 222 cases (31.8%) 
while BTL or AP-PPP contracts are 466 cases (66.7%), indicating that the former is being fewer in 
frequency but usually larger in funding size and it is vice versa for the latter. A predominant share of 
the cases are solicited by the government (570 cases or 81.5%), yet a meaningful share of the unsolicited 
(or private-sector-initiated) cases are used as well (129 cases or 18.5%).  
 
Table 1. Types of PPP contracts in Korea (as of EOY 2016) 
 
As to the institutional characteristics of the two contract types, AP-PPP is generally for those services 
from which a clear revenue stream can be generated (e.g., toll roads, railroads, harbor facilities, and 
airports), whereas C-PPP is used for those that are more public good in nature without a clear user fee 
based cashflow (e.g., museums, schools, and military facilities). (See Table 2 for a comparison of the 
two contract types.) There are several hybrid contracts that differ in terms of the ownership (or timing 
thereof) and the operational right,2 which can be viewed as derivatives out of the two main ones.  
                                          
2 They include BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer), BOO (Build-Own-Operate), BLT (Build-Lease-Transfer) along 
with other hybrid methods.  
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Table 2.  
 
 
In terms of the risk-sharing arrangement, the main difference between the two contracts is which party 
(between SPC and the government) takes the market (or demand) risk in using the facility built: that is, 
under AP-PPP it is SPC who should bear the risk of deviating the realized demand (or actual user fee 
generated) from the projected one because its revenue is solely dependent upon the realized cashflow 
by operating the structure; and, under C-PPP it is the government who ends up taking the risk because 
she guarantees fixed payments to SPC for both building and operating the facility (the installed payment 
for construction, item B in the figure below, and the projected operational cost, item (D), matched with 
the government payment for that, item (C)). Nonetheless, the actual operational cost under C-PPP can 
differ from the projected level, which is labeled and assessed by Park (2015) and Park et al. (2018). In 
the case of AP-PPP, there is no scheduled government payment for operation (nothing for item (C)); 
Instead, realized user fee from operation replaces the item. Another key risk to be considered, for both 
types as a matter of fact, is the counterpary (or default) risk of SPC.          
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Figure 1. Cash flow of C-PPP contract  
 
Source: Park (2015)  
 
Typical PPP contacts take a long time span for both contracting as well as building and operation. For 
the former, in the case of AP-PPP, it takes 1~2 years for initial project planning (about 6 months for C-
-PPP) due to a heightened complexity involved with this type. In addition, both types have to go through 
a series of feasibility tests by the government (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, MOSF, along with the 
Private Investment Management and Assessment Center, PIMAC), which generally takes one to two 
years. After that, the contracting stage – selecting a private partner as primary negotiator, bargaining 
contract terms, and so on - can have more than one year, mainly due to the cost/budget saving effort on 
the part of the public partner. Once a deal is signed, then there are 3~5 years for construction and 20~30 
years for operation. In terms of key stake holders, it is usually a builder (or construction company) for 
BTO (as a shareholder of SPC) along with financial investors and operating companies. There are other 
institutional details, such as insurance coverage for indemnity and damage that can occur during both 
construction and operation phases, taxes required (corporate income tax for SPC, value-added tax, 
among others), as well as conditions for early termination (caused either by SPC or by political reasons 
or natural disasters).         
 
 
Figure 2. Key steps of the PPP procedure in Korea 
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3 Literature review 
 
As to the fiscal effect, PPP Projects are shown to lower construction time or cost overage in Australia 
and other countries, compared to the traditional government-procured Infrastructure projects (Duffield 
(2008), Rajan, Gopinath and Behera (2013), Reznichenko (2012), The World Bank (2014). In particular, 
the time and cost saving effects of PPP projects, generally measured by Value for Money (VFM) 
formulae, in Canada (Deslauriers (2015)), in Portugal (Monteriro (2005)), in Korea (Bae (2015)), in 
India (Roy, Kalidindi and Soundararajan (2014)), as well as other countries (EPEC (European PPP 
Expertise Centre) (2011), Morallos and Amekudzi (2008), Graham (2011)). As to the success factors of 
PPP projects, the literature identifies a proper output specification (Javed, Lam and Zou (2002)), along 
with cost efficiency, trust (among contract counterparties), level of communication, and appropriate 
risk-sharing arrangement (Doloi (2012), and Shen, Platten and Deng (2006)). 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of cost overrun probability 
 
Source: Duffield (2008) 
 
As to the nature of financial risk, Park and Cho (2018) provide a theoretical framework to examine C-
PPP’s risk premium incorporating construction risk, operation risk, and term premium. Using 426 AP-
PPP projects in Korea, the study finds that construction risk has the biggest and robust impact on the 
risk premium. The education and cultural asset groups show systematically higher risk premium than 
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base group (environment asset). The test also supports investor’s behavior of risk averseness because 
the correlation coefficient of investment size is negative. Several policy implications are suggested: A 
procuring government should be prudent to select capable private partner enough to be able to manage 
allocated risk. It is desirable to prepare a meticulous development plan to reduce construction risk; 
Shortening planning period may promote PPP without increasing required risk premium.   
On the other hand, ROBERT J, et, al. (2014) studied whether asset pricing models can predict the future 
returns of publicly-listed PPPs in Australia. They found that asset pricing models (both CAPM and 
Fama-French models) exhibit poor out-of-sample predictive performance when compared to simple, 
fixed excess return models for the period 1997 through 2012. They also suggest the long-term historical 
mean return to be a reasonable starting point for superannuation funds seeking to understand the long-
term expected returns of publicly-listed infrastructure and PPPs. In terms of the systematic risk, 
Rothballer and Kaserer (2012) argue that the reason for the low systematic risk is due to the lower levels 
of market competition in infrastructure based industries, due to the high levels of fixed capital 
investment required.  
Several other studies examine the nature of financial risk of PPP projects. In particular, Bird, Liem and 
Thorp (2012) measured a proper level of infrastructure investment return, using Fama-French three 
factor model. The study used UBS infrastructure index, which include 200 infrastructure stocks with 
mixture of 40% US stocks and 40% European stocks, and remaining 20% from Asia. They revealed 
that infrastructure indices exhibit excess returns with low levels of systematic risks. Vecchi V et al. 
(2013) seek to judge whether excess equity returns exist, using the 77 samples of healthcare PFI 
contracts from 1997 to 2011 in UK. The study measured Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) of 
sponsors against project equity IRR. The average of realized excess equity return over the estimated 
WACC is 9.27%. Gray et al.,(2010) maintained that, in the context of PPPs, the standard framework 
produces a paradox whereby government appears to be made better off by taking on more systematic 
risk. However, they also showed that there is no problem with CAPM theory, but rather is caused by its 
misapplication in practice: the systematic risk of cash flows is frequently mis-estimated, and the 
correction of this error solves the apparent paradox. Shin (2009) assumed that the investment return of 
BTO is comprised of liquidity premium, construction risk premium, operation risk premium, and 
demand forecast risk premium. The study also considered option values of termination clause both by 
government and private investor to estimate the optimal level of investor's return. The estimated range 
of optimal BTO return is from 6.61% to 8.33%. Shim, et al. (2006) researched cost of equity capital for 
BTO based on the financial information of special purpose company (SPC), using CAPM. This study 
is one of the earliest pioneers that tried to estimate cost of capital for PPP project in Korea. 
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4 Data and variables (data sources, variables compiled, summary statistics)  
 
Financial data for BTL and BTO projects have been retrieved from statistics tool called ‘TS 2000’. TS 
2000 features company’s financial data, stock and management information on companies listed on the 
Korea Stock Exchange, companies registered on KOSDAQ, and independent audit provided by Korea 
Listed Companies Association. This data has been utilized as ‘post-contract data’ or ‘realized amount’ 
for AP-PPP and C-PPP. Concession data for the BTL and BTO projects have been retrieved from the 
original contracts between SPCs and line ministries, which has been audited by relevant accountants. 
Concession data has been utilized as ‘ante-contract’ data or ‘projected amount’ for AP PPP and C PPP. 
About AP-PPP (or BTL), PPP projected covers 398 projects, consists of 216 education, 56 national 
defense, 31 culture and tourism, 10 welfare, 4 information and communication, 80 environment, and 1 
railway. Of these, 350 projects were implemented, so we obtained financial data for each Special 
Purpose Company on the TS2000. The data we evicted are a statement of financial position, income 
statement and statement of cash flow. See Tables 3 and 4, and Appendix 1 for the summary statistics 
that are separately compiled for BTL and BTO. 
 
 Project-level DB compiled: 332 C-PPP & 120 AP-PPP cases, from 1998 to 2018  
 Key project=level variables included: 
 Total project cost (mean, minimum, maximum, & STD), by PPP type 
- Project duration, for construction & for operation  
- Projected & ex post yields (plus benchmarking interest rates) 
- Maximum leverage ratios for SPC, projected and realized  
- Insurance contracts and tax requirements (at contract)  
- Minimum capital ratios, one for construction and another for operation 
- Projected vs. realized revenues (for C-PPP)  
- Projected vs. realized operational costs (for AP-PPP) 
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Table 3. AP-PPP : Average Project Period 
Sector 
Construction 
(month) 
Operation 
(month) 
Education 14 234
National defense 23 242
Culture and Tourism 21 247
Welfare 18 240
Information and 
Communication 10 114
Environment 38 240
Railway 53 240
Total 25 222
 
 
Table 4. C-PPP: Average Project Period 
Sector  Construction (month) 
Operation 
(month) 
Road 23 195 
Culture and Tourism 16 113 
Distribution 31 257 
Railway 18 117 
Port 48 451 
Environment 18 131 
Total 26 211 
 
 
In term of the key indicators of financial performance at contract (Tables 5), AP-PPP (BTO) projects 
show higher ex ante yields compared to C-PPP (BTL): on the average, 2.87% ROA for BTL vs. 4.68% 
for BTO; 3.55% ROC for BTL vs. 14.01% for BTO. The operating margin, on the other hand, is higher 
for BTL (0.79%) compared to BTO (-2.47%), while the financial leverage is higher for BTL (80%) than 
BTO (62%).  
 
 
Table 5. Comparison of financial indicators 
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Two main variables to implement the three-factor CAPM are HML, which stands for "High Minus Low” 
in terms of the book-to-market ratio and shows excess return of value stock over growth stock, and 
SMB, which represents "Small Minus Big” in terms of market capitalization and measures the historic 
excess returns of small cap over big cap stocks. We retrieved the local HML and SMB market index 
14 
 
from “FnIndex3”. The index period is from 1997 January to 1999 November and the frequency is weekly 
basis. The SMB is calculated by weighted average of small minus big stocks, which are categorized 
based on median market cap. The HML index is calculated using the difference of High and Low book-
to-market stocks among the three categories of high, medium, and low book-to-market ratio stocks.  
 
Figure 4. Trend of HML and SMB indices  
 
Source: FnIndex  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                          
3 http://beta.fnguide.com/SNI/SNI_FactorModelDetail.asp?u_cd=3FM.2B3.X  
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5 Empirical model and findings  
 
The underlying empirical model used in this study is the Fama-French 3-factor CAPM, which measures 
the sensitivities of a particular asset return to changes in three systematic (or market-wide) risk drivers 
– market risk premium (spread of the return to market portfolio over risk-free rate), book-to-market 
ratio, BTMR, premium (spread between returns to assets with high BTMR minus to those with low 
values), and size risk premium (spread between returns to those with small asset bases minus to those 
with small ones). Given that the firms in our database, SPCs, are mostly non-listed firms, we follow the 
estimation framework suggested by Driessen, Lin and Phalippou, DLP (2012). In particular, DLP (2012) 
introduces a methodology to estimate abnormal performance and risk exposure of nontraded assets’ 
cash flows (hedge funds & Private Equity Funds) based on the financial indicators of the firms in 
question.  
The estimation framework relies on the NPV of each PPP project (equation (1)), which includes both 
cash outlays (-CF0) as well as discounted cash flows with a time-varying discount rate (IRR). The 
numerator, CF, in equation (1) is Net Operational Income (NOI) computed based on the financial data 
for each project for each calendar year, while the discount rate in equation (2), the time-varying IRR, is 
specified as a three-factor CAPM:  
 
 
(1)    
 
(2)  
 
where: 
𝑟௙,௧ ~ risk-free rate (the monetary stabilization bond rate);  
𝑟௠௞௧,௧ ~ Market risk premium (stock market return - 𝑟௙,௧); 
𝑟௛௠௟,௧  ~ Book-to-market risk premium (top companies’ average return in terms of Book 
Value/Market Value minus bottom companies’ average return);  
𝑟௦௠௕,௧ ~ Small-to-large firms’ risk premium (top companies’ average return in terms of size of asset 
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base minus bottom companies’ average return); and, 
α, β ~ parameters to estimate.   
 
This approach allows us to measure the PPP-unique alpha (excess return, ER, to PPP cash flows), the 
contract unique alpha (ER to AP-PPP or BTO contracts), along with the three sensitivity parameters (or 
betas) to the systematic risk factors. The least square optimization problem is to search the parameter 
vector, 𝜃 ൌ ൣ𝛼ଵ  𝛼஻்ை  𝛽௠௞௧  𝛽௛௠௟  𝛽௦௠௕൧ᇱ, that minimizes the following expectation operator: 
 
(3)     . 
 
Given the highly nonlinear nature of the estimation model, GMM turns out to be the proper estimation 
method, whereas the standard error for each parameter is computed through the second moment 
estimation. The preliminary results of the parameter estimation are shown in the table below.  
 
 
Table 6. Empirical results, & preliminary findings 
 
 
The results show that the two intercept terms, 𝛼ଵ,   𝛼஻்ை, are not statistically significant, indicating no 
excess return neither to holding PPP projects nor to BTO projects. Interestingly, the beta for the market 
risk premium, 𝑟௠௞௧,௧, is negative and highly significant, which may be viewed as unconventional in a 
one-factor CAPM but should be interpreted differently under the three-factor model estimated. The 
negative parameter may signal a counter-cyclical nature of PPP cash flows: for example, in an ebullient 
time, general price level (e.g., CPI) tends to rises, and vice versa, which leads to a counter-cyclical cost 
generation for PPP contracts, both BTO and BTL projects. A further digging on this possibility is 
Variable Estimated Coefficient t-statistics
PPP Alpha -0.0003 -0.0002
BTO Alpha 0.0234 0.0130
Market Beta -1.1781 -48.3757
HML Beta 2.0050 16.9056
SMB Beta 0.8353 7.1665
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warranted. The outcome for the second beta, for 𝑟௛௠௟,௧, is positive and statistically significant and the 
magnitude of the parameter is over two, implying that the PPP cash flows are positively correlated with 
the spread for high BTMR stocks and that one unit change in the spread leads to two units change in 
the PPP cash flows. Given the likelihood that the high-BTMR companies’ shares represent value stocks 
(e.g., REITs), PPP cash flows may have a similar clientele effect for cash-poor asset-rich consumer 
segments (i.e., retirees). The third beta, for 𝑟௦௠௕,௧, is also positive and statistically significant with the 
magnitude of roughly one, indicating that PPP cash flows have a positive correlation with the spread 
for small-size stocks. We conjecture this outcome to be caused the high representation of the BTL 
projects, which are generally small in size.        
 
 
6 Policy implications and concluding remarks  
 
In this study, we aim to shed light on the ex post (or realized) cash flow characteristics of PPP 
projects by using an unique project-level data set covering the time-varying performance 
indicators of those cases initiated during 1995 to 2018 in Korea. The estimation results based 
on the three-factor CAPM model indicate that: no excess return, neither to holding PPP projects as 
a whole nor to holding BTO projects are shown; the beta for the market risk premium signals a counter-
cyclical nature of PPP cash flows, for example, through a negative correlation between macroeconomic 
condition and cost indicator to PPP projects; the PPP cash flows are positively correlated with the spread 
for high BTMR stocks, possibly because of the high-BTMR companies are viewed as value stocks that 
share a similar clientele effect for cash-poor asset-rich consumer segments (i.e., retirees); and, PPP cash 
flows also show a positive correlation with the spread for small-size stocks, which may be caused by a 
higher of the BTL projects in our sample. Going forward, a further investigation is warranted to back 
the above findings, which should be viewed as preliminary.  
The ultimate goal of our endeavor is to document policy implications of our findings as to how to 
change existing PPP contract regimes to properly reflect the empirical evidences obtained from this 
study. That is, the questions like how existing PPP contracts in terms of setting the ex ante project yields 
can be modified to better reflect the ex post cash characteristics, or their correlations with the market-
driven risk drivers, and how welfare-enhancing contract rates as well as risk-sharing arrangements can 
be instituted for both public counterparty (the first “P”) as well as private partner (the second “P”) are 
the ones that should be further clarified.  
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Appendix 1. 
A.1. AP-PPP Projected : Summary Statistics  
Sector Classification Mean St.d min max 10th pctl 
90th 
pctl 
Education 
Ratio of sales to cost 2.08 1.74 0.00 4.03 0.00 3.99
Ratio of operating profit to cost 1.14 1.01 -0.07 2.52 -0.01 2.45
Ratio of operating profit to sales 40.89 26.20 0.00 84.26 0.00 69.44
Ratio of net profit to sales -0.05 0.28 -1.72 0.05 -0.01 0.00
National 
defense 
Ratio of sales to cost 2.40 2.10 0.00 4.59 0.00 4.58
Ratio of operating profit to cost 1.49 1.54 -1.15 3.90 -0.02 3.29
Ratio of operating profit to sales 20.58 154.85 -885.91 100.00 0.00 96.52
Ratio of net profit to sales -0.35 2.00 -12.50 0.00 -0.02 0.00
Culture and 
Tourism 
Ratio of sales to cost 2.58 2.26 0.00 5.05 0.00 4.99
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.88 0.85 -0.48 2.16 -0.01 1.87
Ratio of operating profit to sales 9.57 81.59 -447.97 85.41 0.00 50.75
Ratio of net profit to sales -0.03 0.17 -1.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Welfare 
Ratio of sales to cost 1.90 1.62 0.00 3.83 0.00 3.73
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.74 0.73 -0.25 2.02 0.00 1.79
Ratio of operating profit to sales 25.34 29.34 -62.74 100.00 0.00 52.90
Ratio of net profit to sales -0.01 0.05 -0.32 0.03 -0.02 0.00
Information and 
Communication 
Ratio of sales to cost 2.54 4.01 0.00 9.79 0.00 9.67
Ratio of operating profit to cost 1.18 1.82 0.00 4.37 0.00 4.31
Ratio of operating profit to sales 17.61 24.66 0.00 97.10 0.00 46.18
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00
Environment 
Ratio of sales to cost -0.02 0.09 -0.32 0.05 -0.02 0.03
Ratio of operating profit to cost 3.88 3.80 0.00 9.79 0.00 9.59
Ratio of operating profit to sales 1.44 1.67 -0.33 4.37 0.00 4.25
Ratio of net profit to sales 22.28 28.20 -6.03 97.10 0.00 47.52
Railway 
Ratio of sales to cost 0.45 0.49 0.00 1.30 0.00 1.17
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.12 0.42 -0.78 0.98 -0.37 0.76
Ratio of operating profit to sales 4.86 54.24 -143.91 100.00 -72.96 71.35
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.32 -0.01 0.05
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A.2. AP-PPP Realized: Summary Statistics  
Sector Classification Mean St.d min max 10th pctl 
90th 
pctl 
Education 
Ratio of sales to cost 1.29 1.94 0.00 5.06 0.00 4.46
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.48 0.79 0.00 2.31 0.00 1.89
Ratio of operating profit to sales 11.39 17.98 0.00 48.25 0.00 40.60
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
National 
defense 
Ratio of sales to cost 1.78 2.81 0.00 12.07 0.00 5.49
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.32 1.17 -3.91 3.07 0.00 2.20
Ratio of operating profit to sales 6.88 22.41 -72.56 53.33 0.00 46.33
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.00 0.02 -0.13 0.01 0.00 0.01
Culture and 
Tourism 
Ratio of sales to cost 1.28 2.33 0.00 6.38 0.00 5.66
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.56 1.04 -0.14 2.99 0.00 2.58
Ratio of operating profit to sales 6.93 32.49
-
155.01 47.83 0.00 45.10
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.00 0.02 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Welfare 
Ratio of sales to cost 1.00 2.01 0.00 6.15 0.00 5.06
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.64 1.30 0.00 4.26 0.00 2.87
Ratio of operating profit to sales 15.47 27.97 0.00 72.32 0.00 67.69
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Information and 
Communication 
Ratio of sales to cost 1.48 2.89 0.00 8.80 0.00 7.36
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.30 0.86 -0.33 3.74 0.00 1.07
Ratio of operating profit to sales 4.76 12.13 -6.03 47.66 0.00 23.25
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Environment 
Ratio of sales to cost 42.30 50.96 0.00 143.92 0.00 118.70
Ratio of operating profit to cost 2.19 2.91 -1.48 9.06 0.00 6.59
Ratio of operating profit to sales 2.82 3.06 -1.48 8.54 0.00 6.94
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Railway 
Ratio of sales to cost 0.26 0.61 0.00 1.82 0.00 1.58
Ratio of operating profit to cost 0.22 0.53 -0.05 1.65 -0.04 1.35
Ratio of operating profit to sales 13.40 31.19 0.00 90.83 0.00 86.95
Ratio of net profit to sales 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
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A.3. C-PPP Summary Statistics 
Sector Classification Mean St.d min max 10th pctl 
90th 
pctl 
Education 
Mark-up 1.14 0.19 0.08 1.7 1 1.43
Ratio of expenses to revenues 6.11 0.64 3.61 7.68 5.51 6.88
Interest rate for construction loan 6.83 1.07 3.26 10.51 5.72 8.11
Total Private Investment 42,700 33,028 1,797 401,813  21,654  60,156 
Facility rent 74,983 57,457 2,569 690,197  34,835  106,949 
Operating cost 22,415 26,240 564 289,048  5,301  34,749 
National 
defense 
Mark-up 1.13 0.15 0.49 1.29 1.04 1.29
Ratio of expenses to revenues 6.06 0.56 4.55 8.48 5.68 6.92
Interest rate for construction loan 7.32 0.92 5.74 9.97 6.12 8.5
Total Private Investment 69,951 29,526 17,649 157,251  34,371  106,520 
Facility rent 121,106 53,038 26,800 279,000  58,761  184,513 
Operating cost 22,510 8,983 7,563 44,396  11,440  34,604 
Culture and 
Tourism 
Mark-up 1.21 0.15 0.86 1.6 1.04 1.4
Ratio of expenses to revenues 6.09 0.56 4.66 7.05 5.35 6.63
Interest rate for construction loan 7.17 1.01 5.96 10.26 6.06 8.08
Total Private Investment 30,175 21,932 10,731 101,907  11,593  61,993 
Facility rent 55,238 41,597 2,145 183,889  22,428  112,810 
Operating cost 26,019 23,347 2,099 126,532  11,750  49,636 
Welfare 
Mark-up 1.57 0.54 1.17 3 1.19 1.79
Ratio of expenses to revenues 6.31 0.73 5.23 7.17 5.28 7.13
Interest rate for construction loan 7.43 1.31 5.9 9.63 6.18 9.29
Total Private Investment 27,327 19,959 3,976 56,412  5,547  51,280 
Facility rent 42,571 37,513 7,409 115,340  13,011  86,668 
Operating cost 11,931 5,758 5,702 21,467  5,771  19,801 
Information 
and 
Communication 
Mark-up 1.16 0.42 0.7 1.68 0.79 1.56
Ratio of expenses to revenues 5.55 0.82 4.78 6.3 4.81 6.27
Interest rate for construction loan 7.53 1.41 5.8 9.25 6.31 8.74
Total Private Investment 51820 77548 8075 197984 9622 122986
Facility rent 72710 114966 9832 245062 12269 176940
Operating cost 23431 32782 5281 72534 5632 53611
Environment 
Mark-up 1.01 0.17 0.5 1.38 0.82 1.18
Ratio of expenses to revenues 5.69 0.58 4.29 6.81 4.89 6.4
Interest rate for construction loan 6.83 0.97 5 11.5 5.68 7.76
Total Private Investment 71,615 33,429 21,563 150,020  32,749  114,913 
Facility rent 121,723 58,836 35,309 286,178  53,683  194,798 
Operating cost 21,467 12,828 5,348 75,804  9,310  35,594 
Railway 
Mark-up 0.73 0.04 0.7 0.76 0.71 0.75
Ratio of expenses to revenues 5.7 0.04 5.67 5.73 5.68 5.72
Interest rate for construction loan 6.07 0.18 5.94 6.19 5.97 6.17
Total Private Investment 502,186 89,390 438,978 565,394  451,620  552,752 
Facility rent 836,464 146,164 733,110 939,817  753,781  919,146 
Operating cost 60,661 18,316 47,709 73,612  50,299  71,022 
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